docs: add bootstrap and recovery runbooks

docs/runbooks/FIRST-SERVER-BOOTSTRAP.md

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+# First-server bootstrap runbook
+
+- Status: Draft operational procedure; commands/artifacts not yet implemented
+- Target: `zarinpal.amiirkhl.ir`
+- Owner: Platform operator
+- Last updated: 2026-08-20
+
+This is the safe order for preparing a new production host. It is intentionally a human-reviewed checklist, not a copy-paste bootstrap script. Stop on any failed validation and preserve the existing server/DNS state until the failure is understood.
+
+## Preconditions and recorded inputs
+
+Before connecting to the host, record in the change ticket/release record:
+
+- server provider, instance id, public IPv4/IPv6, region, CPU, RAM, disk type/size, and console/recovery access
+- approved OS image and checksum/source; initial target is a supported Ubuntu LTS minimal image
+- operator names, maintenance window, rollback/abandonment condition, and emergency contact
+- DNS zone owner and current `A`/`AAAA`/CAA records for `zarinpal.amiirkhl.ir`
+- SSH source allowlist and at least two tested operator public keys
+- selected rootless or dedicated rootful Docker model (a remaining decision in the platform spec)
+- private registry hostname and read-only production pull identity
+- object-storage bucket/endpoint, retention capability, backup credentials, and separately escrowed encryption key
+- approved release manifest containing exact image digests and all three repository SHAs
+- secret inventory and owner; never put values in the ticket, shell history, or this repository
+
+Do not change DNS before the host passes local and direct-IP validation. Do not reuse Qlockify credentials, certificates, volumes, backup paths, or deploy keys.
+
+## Phase 1: establish recoverable access
+
+1. Open the provider console/recovery channel and confirm it works independently of SSH.
+2. Log in using the provider's initial method. Create named operator accounts and install only approved public keys.
+3. Confirm a second operator can log in in a new session before changing SSH configuration.
+4. Disable direct root SSH and password authentication only after key access and recovery console are proven.
+5. Restrict SSH to the operator source allowlist at the provider firewall and host firewall. Keep the current session open while testing a new one.
+6. Configure time synchronization and verify UTC plus the documented `Asia/Tehran` application assumption. The host itself should log in UTC.
+7. Apply all supported security updates and reboot if required. Re-test console and SSH access after reboot.
+
+Evidence: OS release/kernel, update result, time-sync state, two successful key logins, failed password/root-login test, and firewall rules. Do not record public key private material or session output containing secrets.
+
+## Phase 2: harden and size the host
+
+1. Set a unique hostname and record the provider instance id alongside it.
+2. Configure default-deny inbound firewall rules. Initially allow SSH from the operator allowlist and TCP 80/443; verify from both an allowed and disallowed external source.
+3. Enable unattended security updates with a documented reboot policy and alert path.
+4. Configure disk/inode monitoring, time sync, audit/system logs, log rotation, and OOM visibility before application deployment.
+5. Create dedicated paths with explicit ownership:
+
+   ```text
+   /srv/zarinpal-analytics/           deployment control plane and release records
+   /etc/zarinpal-analytics/config/    protected non-secret environment configuration
+   /etc/zarinpal-analytics/secrets/   runtime secret files, mode 0600 or stricter
+   /var/lib/zarinpal-analytics/       host-managed operational state if required
+   /var/backups/zarinpal-analytics/   encrypted local backup retention only
+   ```
+
+6. Verify every resolved absolute path is on the intended filesystem, not a symlink to a broad/unexpected target, before applying ownership or any future recursive operation.
+7. Reserve enough free space for PostgreSQL growth, one temporary logical dump, three encrypted local backups, container images, and logs while retaining the platform alert floor of at least 20% and 10 GiB free.
+
+## Phase 3: install and constrain Docker
+
+1. Install Docker Engine and the Compose plugin only from Docker's approved repository for the selected OS; pin/record installed versions.
+2. Apply the approved rootless or dedicated rootful design. If the deploy user joins the `docker` group, record that it is effectively root-equivalent and restrict that account accordingly.
+3. Configure the daemon's bounded logging policy before starting application containers.
+4. Ensure Docker starts after reboot and that no unauthenticated TCP daemon socket is enabled.
+5. Log in to the private registry using the production read-only pull identity. Store credentials in the approved host credential mechanism, not the deployment checkout or shell history.
+6. Pull a harmless pinned test image, verify its digest, run it without published ports, remove the test container, and retain the image only if policy allows.
+
+Evidence: Engine/Compose versions, daemon security configuration, socket ownership, log driver/options, registry identity scope, and digest verification.
+
+## Phase 4: install the deployment control plane
+
+1. Create a dedicated deploy machine identity with read access to the deployment repository and no write/push permission. The production host does not need backend/frontend source checkouts when deploying immutable images.
+2. Clone the deployment repository into `/srv/zarinpal-analytics/current` or the approved release-control path. Pin/checkout the reviewed deployment SHA from the release manifest without destructive synchronization of unrelated paths.
+3. Validate repository ownership, remote URL, current SHA, and clean status.
+4. Materialize protected non-secret configuration and secret files outside the checkout. Set owner/mode before writing secret values; verify consumers receive only required files.
+5. Install the production release manifest and verify its signature/checksum, exact target environment, previous release pointer, image digests, and configuration checksum.
+6. Pull every manifest image by digest. Fail if a digest is missing, mutable, untrusted, or blocked by the vulnerability/provenance gate.
+7. Render/validate Compose configuration in a way that does not print secret values into logs. Confirm only Nginx publishes 80/443 and operator endpoints bind only to loopback/private paths.
+
+Do not run `docker compose up`, migrations, import, credential generation, restore, or DNS cutover during this phase.
+
+## Phase 5: DNS and TLS staging
+
+1. Lower DNS TTL in advance if an existing record is moving. Preserve the previous values and rollback time.
+2. Point `A`/`AAAA` only after direct-IP Nginx/host validation succeeds. Remove an `AAAA` record if IPv6 is not actually routed and firewalled correctly.
+3. Verify public authoritative DNS from multiple resolvers and confirm the address matches the current server.
+4. Start only the minimum edge services required for ACME HTTP-01. Verify the challenge path from an external network.
+5. Obtain a staging certificate first and exercise renewal. Then request the production certificate.
+6. Validate certificate names, chain, expiry, TLS 1.2/1.3, canonical redirects, unknown-host rejection, and renewal permissions.
+7. Enable HSTS only after successful production issuance and renewal evidence; preload remains a separate approval.
+
+If issuance fails, stop repeated production requests, inspect DNS/CAA/firewall/challenge routing, and continue serving no plaintext application content.
+
+## Phase 6: first database and application release
+
+1. Acquire the production deployment lock and record the operator/release id.
+2. Start PostgreSQL and Redis only. Verify named-volume targets, authentication, resource limits, and health.
+3. Run the one-off migration at the candidate backend digest. Confirm exit zero and the exact expected migration version.
+4. Start backend and worker. Verify liveness/readiness, worker heartbeat, Asynq `v0.26.0` compatibility, queue limits, and absence of unintended published ports.
+5. Start frontend and verify the static sentinel plus the emitted Iran Yekan font resource. The source font/license remain frontend-owned; no deployment-side injection or copy occurs.
+6. Start/reload Nginx and run public generic health, canonical redirect, security-header, login-page, and authenticated smoke checks.
+7. Verify Prometheus targets/dashboards and test notification delivery before relying on the 15-minute release watch.
+8. Record the active release manifest only after all postflight checks pass.
+
+Failure before the active-manifest switch restores the prior/empty known state. Do not improvise a database down migration.
+
+## Phase 7: one-time data and demo setup
+
+This phase is deliberately separate from server/application bootstrap.
+
+1. Copy or mount the approved challenge archive to an absolute operator-owned path outside Git. Validate path, owner, permissions, size, and SHA-256.
+2. Confirm no migration, restore, backup, or import is active. Acquire the import lock.
+3. Invoke the explicit one-off import service with a read-only mount of exactly that file.
+4. Review import status, checksum, source/accepted/rejected counts, quality report, and reconciliation before declaring the dataset ready.
+5. Run demo credential generation as a separate explicit administrative job. Select a secure one-time output destination outside the repository and Compose logs.
+6. Test at least two merchant accounts and cross-tenant isolation. Remove or escrow plaintext credential output according to the approved operator procedure.
+
+Never add the source archive or credentials to Git, a container image, backup package, or diagnostic bundle.
+
+## Phase 8: backup and handoff gate
+
+1. Run the first encrypted logical PostgreSQL backup.
+2. Verify archive listing/checksum, encrypted local artifact, remote upload, remote checksum, manifest, and retention counts.
+3. Restore that backup to a clean non-production destination and complete application/tenant/analytics validation within the two-hour RTO.
+4. Test certificate, disk, backup-age, availability, API error, SSE heartbeat, and queue-age alerts.
+5. Record current release, DNS, certificate, backup id, achieved RPO/RTO, remaining exceptions, and on-call ownership.
+6. Remove temporary bootstrap credentials/files and close provider rules that are no longer needed.
+
+The host is not considered production-ready until restore rehearsal and alert delivery pass.
+
+## Stop/rollback conditions
+
+Stop without progressing when:
+
+- recovery console or second-operator SSH access is not proven
+- resolved paths, host identity, environment, or release manifest do not match
+- an image is not digest-pinned or provenance/vulnerability checks fail
+- unexpected ports are externally reachable
+- DNS points somewhere unexpected or certificate names/chain are invalid
+- migration, readiness, authenticated smoke, tenant isolation, worker/SSE, monitoring, backup, or restore rehearsal fails
+- secrets appear in output, files have broad permissions, or the deployment checkout is dirty unexpectedly
+
+Rollback DNS to the recorded prior values when the new host cannot pass the cutover window. Preserve logs and manifests, revoke any exposed credential, and do not delete the failed host until evidence and required backups are secured.
+
+## Completion evidence
+
+- [ ] Provider/host identity and capacity recorded
+- [ ] Console plus two key-only operator paths proven
+- [ ] Firewall external tests show only approved ports
+- [ ] Docker/Compose versions and privilege model recorded
+- [ ] Deployment SHA and release manifest verified
+- [ ] Secrets outside Git with restrictive ownership/mode
+- [ ] TLS issuance and renewal tested
+- [ ] Migration, API, worker, frontend/font, Nginx, SSE, and tenant smoke pass
+- [ ] One-time import reconciles and demo credentials stay outside logs/Git
+- [ ] Monitoring targets and alert delivery pass
+- [ ] Encrypted off-host backup and clean restore rehearsal pass within RTO
+- [ ] Active/previous release ids and operator handoff recorded