155 lines
9.6 KiB
Markdown
155 lines
9.6 KiB
Markdown
# PostgreSQL backup and restore runbook
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- Status: Draft operational contract; scripts not yet implemented
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- RPO: 24 hours
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- RTO: two hours
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- Last updated: 2026-08-20
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This runbook adapts Qlockify's logical dump, encrypted S3-compatible upload, local/remote retention, and restore flow while removing environment files from the backup and adding exact-destination/production confirmation guards.
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## Scope and exclusions
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Back up authoritative PostgreSQL data and the minimum manifest required to validate it. Do not include:
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- Redis/AOF/cache/queue data
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- `.env` or secret files
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- deployment SSH/registry/object-store credentials
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- backup decryption key
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- TLS private keys or ACME account data
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- raw challenge CSV archives
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- demo plaintext credential exports
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- frontend font/license files
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- Prometheus/Grafana runtime volumes or container logs
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Redis loss is recovered through empty Redis plus idempotent analytics reconciliation/recomputation, not restore.
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## Backup package contract
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Each encrypted artifact corresponds to one manifest with:
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```text
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format_version
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backup_id
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created_at_utc
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completed_at_utc
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source_environment
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source_host_id
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postgres_server_version
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dump_client_version
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database_name
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database_archive_sha256
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database_archive_bytes
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schema_migration_version
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active_release_id
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deployment_sha
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backend_sha
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frontend_sha
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encryption_scheme_version
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```
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The manifest stores no password, connection URL, secret value, license identifier/text, raw font copy, CSV path/content, or merchant data sample. A checksum of the encrypted remote object is recorded separately from the plaintext archive checksum.
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## Scheduled backup procedure
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1. Acquire a backup lock that conflicts with restore and destructive migration but need not block ordinary application reads/writes.
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2. Resolve and verify the exact production host/database identity. Validate free disk for temporary output plus the encrypted artifact.
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3. Confirm PostgreSQL health, client/server major compatibility, active release id, and migration version.
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4. Create a consistent logical dump using PostgreSQL 18 `pg_dump` custom or directory format. Capture stderr and fail on a non-zero exit.
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5. Inspect the archive table of contents with `pg_restore --list`; reject an empty/truncated/unreadable archive.
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6. Build the non-secret manifest and calculate the plaintext archive SHA-256.
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7. Encrypt the package before moving it into durable local retention. The approved implementation uses authenticated encryption/KDF parameters recorded by `encryption_scheme_version`.
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8. Upload over TLS to the private S3-compatible destination. Upload to a temporary object key, verify remote size/checksum/metadata, then finalize the immutable timestamped key.
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9. Mark the backup successful only after remote verification. Export success timestamp/duration/size metrics.
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10. Retain the newest three verified encrypted local artifacts and seven verified encrypted remote artifacts. Delete stale artifacts only after the new remote object is verified; never delete the last known-good local or remote backup.
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11. Release the lock and ensure temporary plaintext files are removed from the exact temporary directory.
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A cleanup failure is a ticket, not a reason to mark the backup failed if the verified new copy exists. An upload/verification failure is a backup failure and preserves all prior copies.
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## Daily verification
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- last verified remote backup age is under 30 hours
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- archive/manifest/encrypted-object checksums and sizes are non-zero and agree
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- retention counts are at least one and no greater than approved limits after cleanup
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- backup duration/size are within expected bounds or investigated
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- no excluded filenames/classes appear in the archive listing
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- local backup directory and remote bucket are not publicly readable
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- decryption key is retrievable from separate escrow by authorized operators without exposing it in the check record
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## Clean-destination restore rehearsal
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Run monthly and before any approved destructive migration.
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1. Select an explicit backup id, not an unexamined implicit `latest`, and record why it was chosen.
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2. Provision an empty non-production destination with compatible PostgreSQL and enough free space. Confirm its environment/hostname/database do not match production.
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3. Download the exact encrypted object to a new restrictive temporary directory.
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4. Verify remote-object checksum/size, decrypt, validate package and archive checksum, parse the manifest, and inspect `pg_restore --list`.
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5. Treat the dump as trusted code only if it came from the approved bucket/path and passes provenance checks. PostgreSQL warns that restore executes statements controlled by the dump source.
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6. Create a new empty database from `template0` or the equivalent approved empty-cluster procedure. Do not reuse a partially populated database.
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7. Restore with error-stop semantics and reviewed owner/privilege behavior. Preserve complete stdout/stderr in a restricted evidence path without secrets.
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8. Run the selected release's validation suite:
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- expected migration/import manifests
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- representative table/session/attempt counts and invariants
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- at least two merchant logins and cross-tenant denial
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- payer-card keys absent from API/log output
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- Redis initially empty, analytics recomputation succeeds, four sections/SSE work
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- frontend and API compatibility for the manifest's release
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9. Record elapsed time, achieved RPO, achieved RTO, sizes/counts, validation result, operator, and remediation.
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10. Destroy rehearsal resources only after evidence is retained and the exact destination is revalidated.
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## Production restore approval guard
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Production restore is destructive/exclusive and always requires explicit human approval. The future implementation must require all of these independent inputs:
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- `RESTORE_ENVIRONMENT=production`
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- exact expected host identity matching the current provider instance
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- exact expected database name
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- explicit backup id/object key (no automatic `latest`)
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- a typed confirmation phrase containing both production and the backup id
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- active maintenance mode and deployment/restore lock
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- approved incident/change record and named operator
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- current-state backup when PostgreSQL is readable and doing so will not worsen the incident
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If any input is absent or mismatched, exit before stopping writers, dropping/renaming a database, extracting over a target, or running `pg_restore`.
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## Production restore sequence
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1. Announce maintenance and stop public writes/new sessions. Preserve an operator-only health path.
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2. Acquire the exclusive deployment/restore lock; stop worker before backend so no jobs write during restore.
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3. Capture the active/previous release manifests, database identity, incident timestamps, and current-state backup when safe.
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4. Perform all download/decrypt/checksum/archive/provenance checks from the rehearsal procedure before mutating database state.
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5. Restore into a newly created empty database/cluster. Do not pipe an unchecked dump directly into the active production database and do not recursively delete a computed volume/path.
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6. Validate restore completeness and application invariants using the release compatible with the backup manifest. Apply only explicitly approved forward migrations.
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7. Start with empty Redis. Start backend/worker, confirm readiness, idempotent stale-run reconciliation, cold-cache analytics, sessions, and SSE behavior.
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8. Switch application connectivity to the validated restored destination using the approved implementation strategy.
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9. Run public TLS/login/dashboard plus private database/queue/tenant smoke checks. Observe for 15 minutes.
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10. Reopen traffic, mark the restore complete, and schedule a fresh backup. Retain the old database until the incident owner approves disposal under a separate exact-target procedure.
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Do not automatically restore `.env`/secrets, TLS, Redis, or frontend assets from a database backup. Reconstruct platform configuration from Git/release records and secrets from separate escrow.
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## Failure handling
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| Failure | Action |
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| Backup lock already held | Exit without starting a second backup; alert if stale |
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| `pg_dump` non-zero or unreadable listing | Delete only the exact failed temporary artifact; keep prior backups; page on age threshold |
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| Encryption failure | Do not persist/upload plaintext; secure exact temp path and investigate |
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| Remote upload/checksum failure | Keep encrypted local artifact and all prior remote copies; bounded retry; alert |
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| Retention cleanup failure | Keep extra copies; ticket; never broaden deletion globs/paths |
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| Manifest/archive mismatch | Quarantine artifact and select another known-good backup |
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| Restore SQL/object failure | Keep traffic closed, preserve logs/destination, do not rerun blindly into partial DB |
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| Post-restore invariant failure | Do not switch/reopen; return to old database if safe or select another backup |
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| Missing decryption key | Stop; encrypted backup is unrecoverable without the separately escrowed key |
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| Wrong environment/host/database confirmation | Abort before mutation and record denied attempt |
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## Acceptance evidence
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- [ ] Daily backup completed and verified remotely within 30 hours
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- [ ] Backup contains PostgreSQL archive plus non-secret manifest only
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- [ ] Three local/seven remote verified encrypted artifacts retained
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- [ ] Restore rehearsal uses an explicit backup id and clean non-production database
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- [ ] Archive trust/checksum/listing/compatibility checks precede restore
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- [ ] Application, tenant, session, cold-cache, worker, and SSE validations pass
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- [ ] Achieved RPO <=24 hours and RTO <=2 hours recorded
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- [ ] Every missing production confirmation factor aborts before mutation
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- [ ] No Redis, env, secrets, TLS keys, CSV, credentials, font/license, logs, or monitoring runtime data enter backup
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